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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SHARON HOKE, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17243 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OP TEAMSTERS, 
LOCAL 182, "^  
Respondent, 
-and-
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
Intervenor. 
SHARON HOKE, pro se 
MURAD & MURAD (FREDERICK W. MURAD of counsel), for 
Respondent 
RICHARD M. GREENSPAN, P.C. (STUART A. WEINBERGER of 
counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 182 (Local 182) to, 
a decision by the Assistant Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Assistant Director) on a charge 
filed by Sharon Hoke. Hoke alleges that Local 182 breached its 
duty of fair representation in violation of §209-a.2(c) of the 
Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) when it discontinued 
her medical and disability benefits immediately after it lost a 
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representation election to United Public Service Employees Union 
Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers District Council 
42 4 (Local 424), which has intervened in the proceeding. 
After a hearing, the Assistant Director held that Local 182 
had violated the Act because it caused Hoke's benefits as 
provided by and through a separate benefit fund to terminate 
before it was decertified and that its disclaimer of 
representation rights prior to its decertification on 
September 19, 1995, was ineffective because it was neither 
unequivocal nor in good faith. 
Local 182 argues in its exceptions that our jurisdiction 
over this charge is preempted under the federal Employee 
1
 Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), as amended,-7 which 
allegedly vests the judiciary with exclusive jurisdiction over 
all issues pertaining to health, hospital and other trust fund 
benefits. On the merits, Local 182 argues that its actions 
cannot be arbitrary because it acted in compliance with benefit 
fund rules as fixed by ERISA. It argues that it was the benefit 
fund, not it, which terminated Hoke's and all other unit 
employees7 benefits pursuant to a disclaimer of representation 
which was unequivocal and in good faith. Local 182 also takes 
exception to that part of the Assistant Director's order 
requiring it to reimburse Hoke for financial loss attributable to 
the cessation of fund coverage for the period from September 1, 
" i -729 U.S.C. §§1001 et seq. as amended by the Multi-Employer 
Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1990, 29. U.S.C. §§1332(a) et seq. 
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1995, through September 19, 1995, the date of Local 424's 
certification. Local 182 argues in that regard that the benefit 
fund is solely responsible for any medical or disability benefits 
which might be owed to Hoke. 
Local 424 argues that the Assistant Director's decision is 
correct and should be affirmed. It argues that an incumbent 
union should not be permitted to abandon a unit after it has 
participated in a representation election. Local 424 argues also 
that the Assistant Director's remedy is correct because Local 182 
caused Hoke's benefits to end. Hoke has not filed a response to 
the exceptions. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the Assistant Director's decision. 
The material facts are not in dispute and we merely 
summarize them because they are set forth in detail in the 
Assistant Director's decision. 
By petition filed in June 1995, Local 424 challenged Local 
182's status as the exclusive bargaining agent for a unit of 
employees of the Utica Transit Authority (Authority) which 
included Hoke. A count of mail ballots was held on August 31, 
1995. Local 424 received a majority of the valid votes cast. 
Local 424 was certified pursuant to that vote by our order dated 
September 19, 1995.2/ 
g/Utica Transit Auth. , 28 PERB J[3000.53 (1995). 
^ Board - U-17243 -4 
The benefits in issue are both medical and disability. 
Those benefits were provided to Hoke and other unit employees by 
the New York State Teamster Council Health and Hospital Fund 
(Fund), an entity distinct from Local 182, pursuant to a 
collective bargaining agreement between Local 182 and the 
Authority. During the election campaign, Local 182 informed unit 
employees that their Fund-sponsored benefits would end if 
Local 424 won the election because only units represented by 
participating Teamster locals were eligible to receive those 
benefits. 
On August 31, after the ballot count, Local 182's president, 
Terence Majka, distributed a letter to unit employees informing 
them that Fund benefits would cease at the end of that day 
because Local 182 was "not a participating Teamster local within 
the Fund structure". That same day, Majka faxed the PERB 
election agent a letter notifying him that it accepted the 
election results and acknowledged Local 424 as the representative 
of the unit employees. Also that day, Majka notified the Fund 
that Local 182 was no longer the bargaining agent for unit 
employees. 
In response to a letter from the Assistant Director stating 
that Local 182's responsibilities as bargaining agent would 
continue until Local 424's certification, which was expected on 
September 19, Majka wrote a letter to the Assistant Director 
dated September 11, 1995, clarifying this August 31 fax. This 
letter was copied to Local 424 and the Authority. Majka's 
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September 11 letter stated that Local 182 was accepting the 
election results, that it wanted to avoid any problems with 
transition and that it disclaimed the unit for the benefit of the 
employees. In that same September 11 letter, Majka also stated 
that the Fund's rules required the termination of Fund benefits 
immediately as to "any unit that decertified from a Teamster 
local". 
Hoke entered the hospital for surgery on September 8, 1995. 
While in the hospital, Hoke was notified by hospital officials 
that she no longer had any medical insurance coverage, which she 
later learned had been cancelled as of September 1, 1995. On 
October 2, 1995, the Fund rejected Hoke's earlier claim for 
disability benefits. 
All of Local 182's arguments which rest on the distinction 
between it and the Fund are rejected. The violation of the Act 
by Local 182 as found and affirmed rests on Local 182's actions 
only. Nothing the Fund did or did not do is in issue under this 
charge and no remedy is directed against the Fund. By 
disclaiming its representation rights prior to Local 424's 
certification, and notifying the Fund on August 31 that it had 
done so, Local 182 caused the termination of Hoke's benefits. 
Nothing in this record even suggests that the Fund would have 
taken that action on its own prior to September 19, when Local 
182 was decertified pursuant to the certification of Local 424. 
The only substantive question presented to the Assistant Director 
and to us on appeal is whether Local 182's voluntary disclaimer 
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violated its duty of fair representation under §209-a.2(c) of the 
Act. There being no issue affecting the Fund, no preemption 
issue is raised and all of the other defenses resting on the 
nature or operation of the Fund simply have no application in 
this case. 
The issue before us is not whether Local 182 had the 
statutory right to remain the bargaining agent until Local 424's 
certification on September 19. It clearly could have retained 
its status as the exclusive bargaining agent, with the 
accompanying rights and representation responsibilities, until 
Local 424 was certified. The question for us is whether and 
under what circumstances a union may renounce its status as the 
) exclusive bargaining agent for a unit, disclaim its statutory 
representation rights and duties, and lawfully abandon a unit it 
has represented. 
As the Assistant Director observed, we,spoke to this issue 
in Cove Neck Police Benevolent Association.-7 We there 
recognized that a union's abandonment of its unit might violate 
the Act. Lacking precedent of our own specifying the 
circumstances under which a disclaimer is proper and those in 
which it is improper, the Assistant Director appropriately turned 
to decisions under the National Labor Relations Act for guidance. 
Having examined those private sector decisions,-'' we conclude 
3/24 PERB 13028 (1991) . 
^E.q., Dvcus v. NLRB. 615 F.2d 820, 103 LRRM 2686 (9th Cir. 
.-' 1980) . 
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that they are entirely consistent with the purposes and policies 
of the Act and strike a proper balance of the rights of public 
sector unions, employers and employees. Those decisions find and 
we ourselves hold that a union may voluntarily relinquish its 
authority and rights as the exclusive representative of a 
negotiating unit, and thereby terminate its corresponding duty of 
fair representation, by both unequivocally and in good faith 
disclaiming further interest in representing the unit. The good 
faith component of this standard, we believe, requires that the 
disclaimer be for a proper purpose and that it be communicated to 
all interested persons and parties reasonably in advance of a 
date certain by which the union will cease serving as the 
) employees' bargaining agent. 
As this case well demonstrates, these standards are 
minimally necessary to promote stability in the transition 
between bargaining agents, to help ensure that public employers 
can continue the terms and conditions of their employees' 
employment without interruption, and to prevent a union from 
unfairly influencing the conduct or outcome of representation 
elections, or penalizing employees for exercising their 
fundamental statutory right to seek representation by an employee 
organization of their own choosing. 
Without regard to the purpose behind Local 182's disclaimer 
of representation, it was not even arguably unequivocal and on 
notice to all interested persons until September 11, and by that 
date, Hoke's medical and disability benefits had already been 
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cancelled pursuant to Local 182's August 31 notice to the Fund. 
It was not until September 11 that Local 424 and Hoke's employer 
were first notified that Local 182 unequivocally disclaimed the 
unit. Nor did Local 182 ever give advance notice to anyone of 
its intent to disclaim representation as of a future date 
certain. All of its communications, including the September 11 
letter, were disclaimers which were either without reference to a 
date certain or ones intended to be effective immediately. As 
Local 182's disclaimer was not unequivocal and not on advance 
notice before it caused the Fund to cancel Hoke's benefits, it 
did not have the right under the Act to disclaim its 
representation rights and duties. Therefore, its disclaimer was 
not effective to terminate its duty of fair representation. By 
causing the Fund to prematurely terminate Hoke's medical and 
disability benefits, Local 182 violated §209-a.2(c) of the Act 
because its actions were arbitrary as a matter of law. 
One remedial issue is presented on appeal which necessitates 
comment. There is apparently no dispute that Hoke's medical 
bills have been paid by Local 424. It is unknown, however, 
whether Hoke received any disability benefits from any other 
source. Make-whole relief is intended to place aggrieved parties 
in the position they would have been in had the statutory 
improper practice not been committed.-7 The Assistant 
Director's order covers Hoke's "financial loss". The meaning of 
^State of New York (Semowich) , 26 PERB J[3026 (1993) ; Burnt 
Hills-Ballston Lake Cent. Sch. Dist.. 25 PERB f3066 (1992). 
Board - U-172 43 -9 
the order is unclear. If it is intended to mean that Local 182 
is not required to pay Hoke's medical expenses because they may 
have been paid by another, then the order is inadequate because 
it absolves Local 182 of one of the major consequences of its 
statutory violation. The order also does not effectuate the 
policies of the Act, however, if it requires Local 182 to pay 
Hoke a sum of money equal to the medical and disability benefits 
she would have received from or through the Fund because Hoke 
would thereby receive a windfall to the extent those benefits 
were actually paid by Local 424 or another, unless the payor were 
to recoup from her, either voluntarily or in some other 
proceeding, the monies it actually paid to her or others on her 
i behalf. Both of these remedial issues are addressed if the order 
is amended to ensure that Hoke is merely made whole and that 
Local 182 is held fully responsible for the violation of the Act 
we have found it to have committed. 
For the reasons set forth above, Local 182's exceptions are 
denied and the Assistant Director's decision and order, as 
amended hereafter, are affirmed. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that 
Local 182: 
1. Pay to Hoke a sum of money equal to the medical and 
disability benefits, not received by her from any other 
source, which would have been paid by or through the 
Fund to her, or to others on her behalf, for the period 
from September 1, 1995, to September 19, 1995, with 
) 
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interest on this sum at the rate of nine percent per 
annum. 
2. Pay to Local 424, and any others making payment of 
medical or disability benefits to Hoke, or to others on 
her behalf, a sum of money equal to any payments of 
medical or disability benefits actually made to her, or 
to others on her behalf, which would have been paid by 
or through the Fund to her, or others on her behalf, 
for the period from September 1, 1995 to September 19, 
1995, with interest on any sum owing at the rate of 
nine percent per annum. 
3. Mail the attached notice to the last known home address 
of each of the employees in the negotiating unit of 
Authority employees which includes Hoke. 
DATED: January 29, 1997 
Albany, New York 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
-—~—~~ PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT^  ~~ 
we hereby notify all employees of the Utica Transit Authority (Authority) in the unit formerly represented by the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 182 (Local 182), which is now represented by United Public Service Employees Union Local 
424, A Division of United Industry Workers District Council 424 (Local 424), that Local 182 will: 
1. Pay to Sharon Hoke a sum of money equal to the medical and disability benefits, not received 
by her from any other source, which would have been paid by or through the New York State 
Teamster Council Health and Hospital Fund (Fund) to her, or to others on her behalf, for the 
period from September 1, 1995, to September 19, 1995, with interest on this sum at the rate 
of nine percent per annum. 
2. Pay to Local 424, and any others making payment of medical or disability benefits to Hoke, 
) or to others on her behalf, a sum of money equal to any payments of medical or disability 
benefits made to her, or to others on her behalf, which would have been paid by or through 
the Fund to her, or others on her behalf, for the period from September 1,1995 to September 
19, 1995, with interest on any sum owing at the rate of nine percent per annum. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS. LOCAL 182 
Tf Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by-^tiy other material. 
( ) STATE OF NEW YORK PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, DIVISION 726, 
APL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
— — -and- ~ CASE-NOST—U-a5254—& 
U-16037 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
GLADSTEIN, REIF & MEGINNISS (WALTER M. MEGINNISS, JR., and 
ELLEN DICHNER of counsel), for Charging Party 
MARTIN A. SCHNABEL (JOYCE R. ELLMAN of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the New York 
City Transit Authority (Authority) and cross-exceptions filed by 
the Amalgamated Transit Union, Division 726, AFL-CIO (ATU), to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) finding that the 
Authority violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees7 Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally transferred work 
exclusive to ATU's bargaining unit to nonunit employees 
represented by the Transit Workers Union (TWU).-1 The ATU 
alleges that the Authority assigned bus maintenance and repair to 
nonunit employees on November 15, 1993 (Case No. U-15254) and 
again on August 4, 1994 (Case No. U-16037). The Authority denied 
^The TWU was put on notice of these charges but it did not 
intervene. 
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the material allegations of the charges and raised several 
affirmative defenses. 
After several days of hearing, the ALT found that the 
regular maintenance and repair of buses depoted in Staten Island 
was the exclusive work of the unit represented by ATU. The 
assignment of that work to employees in the TWU's unit violated 
the Authority's duty to negotiate and to remedy that violation 
the ALJ ordered the Authority to make ATU unit employees whole 
for the loss of any wages or benefits suffered as a result of the 
transfer of this work to nonunit employees on November 15, 1993, 
and August 4, 1994. The Authority excepts to the ALJ's decision, 
arguing that the ALJ erred in finding that the work in issue was 
exclusive to ATU, in rejecting the Authority's defenses of 
operational necessity, managerial prerogative, change in level of 
service, waiver and timeliness, and in ordering the Authority to 
"make whole" the ATU unit employees. ATU supports the ALJ's 
decision, but it cross-excepts to his failure to issue a cease 
and desist order. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of 
the parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ, but 
modify the order as discussed infra. 
The ATU represents all Authority employees in the title of 
bus maintainer at the Yukon and Castleton depots in Staten 
Island. These employees inspect buses assigned to Staten Island 
and perform routine repairs and maintenance on the buses to 
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ensure their uninterrupted service or their return to service.-1 
Buses that require major repair work are sent to the East New 
York base shop in Brooklyn. The TWU represents the bus 
maintainers who work at that shop, as well as the bus maintainers 
at the other depots located in the New York City boroughs, except 
for Staten Island. 
The ALT found that the Authority transferred the 
transmission work needed to be done on one bus, assigned to the 
Yukon depot in Staten Island, to the East New York base shop on 
November 15, 1993. That bus was returned to Staten Island after 
the transmission work was completed. On August 4, 1994, work on 
transmissions, air-conditioners, brakes, starters, generators and 
HSO work was done by TWU unit employees out of the Jackie Gleason 
depot in Brooklyn on several buses also assigned to the Yukon 
depot. When the repairs were completed, those buses were 
returned to Staten Island. 
The ALT found that unit employees had exclusivity over work 
he defined as the regular, routine repair and maintenance of 
Authority buses stationed in Staten Island. The Authority argues 
that the work should not have been defined by geographic location 
because the same work was performed at all of its depots and 
that, even as the ALT defined the unit work, it has not been 
exclusively performed by ATU unit employees, 
-
7This work includes work on generators, transmissions, air-
conditioners, starters, break relining and heavy scheduled 
operations (HSO), a task involving the complete overhaul of the 
undercarriage of the bus. 
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We have held frequently that the creation of a discernible 
boundary to unit work will allow an employee organization to 
retain exclusivity over work even though it would not have such 
exclusivity without such a boundary.-7 Section 1.2 of the 
collective bargaining agreement between the ATU and the Authority 
recognizes the ATU as the "exclusive bargaining representative 
... of all of the hourly paid operating and maintenance employees 
of the Authority in the titles listed in Appendix A, ... in the 
Staten Island Bus Division." It is evident that the Authority 
itself has seen fit to define ATU's unit by reference to the 
Staten Island depots. The only buses upon which these employees 
perform routine repairs and maintenance are buses stationed in 
Staten Island. As we noted in Hudson City School District; 
[Jjob location can form a discernible boundary to unit 
work within which a union may maintain its exclusivity 
even if there is no exclusivity over the job function 
beyond that boundary.-7 
The record clearly establishes that only ATU's unit 
employees performed routine maintenance and repair of the buses 
stationed in Staten Island. That the same services are performed 
at depots located in the other boroughs on buses stationed at 
those locations by nonunit employees in the same job title does 
not disturb ATU's exclusivity over the work here in issue. A 
^Clinton Community College, 29 PERB 53066 (1996) ; Hudson City 
Sch. Dist.. 24 PERB 53039 (1991); City of Rochester, 21 PERB 
fl3040 (1988), conf '&. 155 A.D.2d 1003, 22 PERB 57035 (4th Dep't 
1989) . 
^24 PERB 53039, at 3080 (1991). 
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discernible boundary around the work at the Staten Island depots 
has been recognized and maintained by the Authority, and by this 
decision we merely recognize the unit work which the Authority 
itself has defined by contract and practice. 
The Authority also argues that ATU lacks exclusivity even 
over the performance of routine bus maintenance and repair on 
buses stationed in Staten Island because vendors and nonunit 
employees have done that work. The ALJ found, however, and the 
record supports his finding, that the instances in which vendors 
performed routine maintenance or repair on buses assigned to 
Staten Island had been as part of repairs pursuant to warranty. 
These few instances and the circumstances surrounding them do not 
destroy ATU's exclusivity. Neither do the few occasions when 
nonunit employees, primarily those at the East New York base 
shop, did routine repair and maintenance on buses stationed in 
Staten Island. The record establishes that when a bus stationed 
in Staten Island breaks down in another borough, a road crew 
attempts to put the bus back in service. If that is not 
possible, attempts are made to bring the bus to its assigned 
depot for repair. In a few cases, warranted by the extent of 
repairs necessary, the buses have been repaired at the nearest 
available depot. Finally, the record indicates that there have 
been a few isolated incidents when a bus stationed in Staten 
Island had routine repair or maintenance performed at another 
depot. However, to the extent that the work was performed by 
nonunit personnel at the East New York base shop, it was 
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performed in conjunction with the more extensive repairs which 
are done there. We have previously found that a union does not 
forfeit exclusivity over bargaining unit work simply because of 
the performance of that work by nonunit personnel doing so 
"merely as an incident to the performance of nonunit work...."-/ 
The ALT further found that the record evidenced only a few 
isolated incidents where nonunit employees performed routine 
repairs and maintenance on buses stationed in Staten Island. In 
those cases, the ATU either filed a grievance or received an 
assurance from the Authority that the situation was 
nonprecedential. We find, as did the ALT, that this casual and 
occasional performance of the work in issue by nonunit employees 
and vendors did not breach the exclusivity that the ATU otherwise 
had over the routine repair and maintenance of buses stationed in 
Staten Island. There is no dispute that the work performed by 
nonunit employees on November 15, 1993, and August 4, 1994, was 
the routine repair and maintenance of buses assigned to Staten 
Island. Such transfers violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act, unless 
there is any merit to the Authority's defenses. 
The Authority argues that the ALT mischaracterized the basis 
for its waiver defense. . The Authority relies on §1.12 of its 
collective bargaining agreement with the ATU, which provides, in 
n o r f i n a n - l - r -ov- f - . UTT-ies r\c*r< T C T r\r> Tji-i •hV> y o q n o n ' f -t-/~» +-V10 -FaT-m "i nrt /-vii+- /-i-F 
any particular work shall remain solely that of the Authority." 
^Village of Malverne, 28 PERB 53042, at 3099 (1995). 
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The Authority asserts that the ATU, by agreeing that the 
Authority may "farm out" work, clearly has waived its right to 
object to the assignment of unit work to nonunit employees in the 
same title. The ALJ found that neither this clause nor the 
Authority's broadly worded management rights clause-' evidenced 
the type of clear, unmistakable and unambiguous relinquishment of 
a known right required for the finding of a waiver. We agree. 
The language of §1.12 refers only to "farming out" unit work. We 
find that this reference is only to sub-contracting unit work to 
nonemployees of the Authority because the record evidences that 
the ATU and the Authority did not intend this language to cover 
the transfer of unit work to other, nonunit employees of the 
Authority. The ATU president gave unrebutted testimony that 
§1.12 was intended to cover the transfer of unit work to non-
Authority employees only. The language of §1.12 does not clearly 
waive the ATU's right to negotiate transfers of unit work between 
groups of the Authority's own employees, and we cannot assume 
that because the ATU has agreed that the Authority may "farm out" 
unit work, that it must also have agreed to the unilateral 
-
7The relevant language in §1.16 is: 
Without limitation upon the exercise of any of its 
statutory responsibilities, the Authority shall have 
the unquestioned right to exercise all normally 
accented management prerogatives including the ricrht 
to fix operating and personnel schedules, impose 
layoffs, determine work loads, arrange transfers, order 
new work assignments, and issue any other directive 
intended to carry out its managerial responsibilities 
to operate the transit facilities safely, efficiently 
and economically. 
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transfer of all bargaining unit work in any circumstance.-7 
Neither is the language of the management rights clause 
sufficient to grant the Authority the unfettered right to 
transfer unit work to nonunit employees. A general management 
rights clause does not give rise to the waiver of the right to 
negotiate in good faith, nor can it confer upon an employer the 
right to unilaterally transfer unit work to nonunit personnel.-7 
The Authority also alleges that operational necessity 
required the transfer of unit work on November 15, 1993 and 
August 4, 1994. It argues that the ALJ erred in not allowing the 
introduction of evidence in support of its argument that it acted 
to return buses to service and to enhance its service to the 
public. The ALJ allowed an offer of proof in which the Authority 
argued that it had a shortage of buses in service and that this 
was affecting its ability to put enough buses on the road to 
provide adequate service to the public. The Authority did not 
make any offer of proof of a compelling need to act in the manner 
that it did, or that it had negotiated with the ATU to the point 
of impasse and remained willing to negotiate the transfer. Based 
upon the offer of proof, the ALJ correctly ruled that no further 
Z7State of New York (Dep't of Correctional Serv.K 27 PERB 13055 
(1994), conf'd, 220 A.D.2d 19, 29 PERB 17008 (3d Dep't 1996). 
g7State of New York - Unified Court Svs., 28 PERB 13014 (1995); 
County of Broome, 22 PERB 13019 (1989). 
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evidence was necessary. Relying on our earlier decisions-7, the 
ALT held in his decision confirming his ruling at the hearing, 
that the Authority had not established a compelling need defense 
because it had not offered evidence that it had no other options 
open to it but to transfer ATU's unit work, that it had 
negotiated that transfer to impasse with ATU, or that it was 
willing to continue negotiations after the transfers. While the 
Authority had concerns relating to service, there were other 
options open to it to address the need to get certain buses back 
in service, such as negotiating with the ATU or authorizing 
overtime. It elected not to pursue these options and it chose 
instead to unilaterally transfer unit work. On balance, we do 
not find that the ALT erred in either his ruling at the hearing 
or in his disposition of the Authority's defense.—7 
The Authority argues also that the charges are untimely, not 
because they were not filed within four months of the transfers 
of unit work in November 1993 and August 1994, as required by our 
Rules of Procedure (Rules)—7, but because it has been assigning 
work performed by ATU's unit to nonunit employees for years, with 
the ATU's knowledge and acquiescence. This argument is 
essentially one of waiver by conduct and is without merit. "An 
-
7City of Rochester 27 PERB 53031 '1994N; New York City Transit 
Auth., 19 PERB 53043 (1986); Wappinqers Cent. Sch. Dist., 19 PERB 
53037 (1986). 
^
7Countv of Clinton, 28 PERB 53041 (1995). 
H7Rules, §204.1(a)(1). 
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improper practice charge is not rendered untimely because a 
charging party might be found to have previously waived its right 
to negotiate."—7 Here, as we have already found, there is no 
evidence of waiver by the ATU of its right to negotiate the 
transfers of unit work to nonunit employees which occurred in 
November 1993 and August 1994. As the charges were filed within 
four months of the acts alleged to be improper, they are timely. 
Finally, we find that the make-whole remedy ordered by the 
ALJ is appropriate. First, there should be little difficulty in 
identifying the employees who have suffered any loss of wages or 
benefits as a result of the Authority's transfer of work to 
nonunit employees. Second, without the make-whole remedy, 
bargaining unit employees deprived of the unit work could not 
recoup whatever losses, if any, that they incurred by virtue of 
the violation.—7 We do modify the ALJ's remedy, however, by 
including a cease and desist order. Such an order is appropriate 
to ensure that the rights of ATU unit employees will not be 
violated in the future by similar unilateral transfers.—7 
Based on the foregoing, the exceptions of the Authority are 
denied, the cross-exception of the ATU directed to the remedial 
order is granted, and the decision of the ALJ is affirmed. 
^Auburn Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 25 PERB f3055, at 3116 (1992). 
^State of New York. 16 PERB [^3050 (1983). 
—
7New York City Transit Auth., supra. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Authority: 
1. Cease and desist from unilaterally transferring to nonunit 
employees the work of employees of the unit represented by 
the ATU, consisting of the regular, routine repair and 
maintenance of Authority buses assigned to Staten Island. 
Make ATU unit employees whole for wages and benefits, if 
any, lost as a result of its unilateral transfer to nonunit 
employees of transmission work on November 15, 1993, and its 
transfer of transmission, HSO, brake relines, generator, 
starter and air-conditioning work on August 4, 1994, with 
interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
Sign and post the attached notice in all locations at which 
notices of information to ATU unit employees are ordinarily 
posted. 
DATED: January 29, 1997 
Albany, New York 
'axilin© R. Kinsella, Ch Pa'ulij&e? ella" airperson 
Eric if. Schmertz, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT A C T — — — — 
we hereby notify all employees of the New York City Transit Authority (Authority) in the unit represented by the Amalgamated 
Transit Union, Division 726, AFL-CIO (ATU) that the Authority will: 
1. Not unilaterally transfer to nonunit employees the work of employees of the unit represented by the ATU, consisting 
of the regular, routine repair and maintenance of Authority buses assigned to Staten Island. 
2. Make ATU unit employees whole for wages and benefits, if any, lost as a result of its unilateral transfer to nonunit 
employees of transmission work on November 15, 1993 and its transfer of transmission, HSO, brake relines, 




NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION/ INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, TOWN OF 
CLARENCE UNIT OF LOCAL 815, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17333 
TOWN OF CLARENCE, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (ROBERT REILLY of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
NICHOLAS J. SARGENT, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the Town of Clarence 
(Town) violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally consolidated coffee 
breaks of its Water Department employees who are in a unit 
represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Town of Clarence Unit of Local 815 
(CSEA). 
After a hearing, the ALJ determined that the Town had 
unilaterally consolidated two fifteen-minute coffee breaks, one 
taken by unit employees in the morning and one in the afternoon, 
^ Board - U-17333 -2 
into one thirty-minute coffee break to be taken in the morning. 
Although the Town alleged in its answer that the management 
rights clause in its 1992-95 collective bargaining agreement with 
CSEA waived CSEA's right to negotiate the change, the ALT, 
determining that the language was too broad to evidence a clear 
and knowing waiver of CSEA's bargaining rights, found that the 
Town had violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
The Town excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that it was 
not required to bargain its decision to consolidate coffee breaks 
because the change did not increase the employees' workday or 
significantly increase their work load. CSEA supports the ALT's 
decision. 
) Based upon our review of the record and a consideration of 
the parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
Paid time off from work in the form of coffee breaks is 
mandatorily negotiable.-7 The Town's contractual management 
rights clause gives it the right "to direct, deploy and utilize 
the work force....11 The ALJ rejected the Town's waiver defense, 
finding that the language relied on by the Town was far too broad 
to establish a knowing and meaningful waiver of CSEA's right to 
negotiate the change in the scheduling of the coffee breaks. We 
affirm the ALJ's finding in this regard. The Town's management 
^Inc. Village of Rockville Centre, 18 PERB [^3 082 (1985) . 
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rights clause is "nonspecific and too general to operate as a 
plain and clear waiver of bargaining rights"-7 in this regard. 
For the first time in its exceptions, the Town argues that 
any change in break time which does not increase the employees' 
workday or their work load is not mandatorily negotiable and 
that, therefore, the charge should be dismissed. This argument 
is without merit. Absent a meritorious defense, a unilateral 
change in a mandatory subject of negotiations violates the Act, 
whether or not the change affects the length of the workday or 
work load.-7 The number of times employees are released from 
their job duties for rest and refreshment are themselves 
mandatorily negotiable subjects. By unilaterally consolidating 
two fifteen-minute coffee breaks into a single thirty-minute 
coffee break, the Town violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Town's exceptions are denied 
and the decision of the ALJ is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Town: 
1. Restore the practice of one fifteen-minute coffee break 
in the morning and one fifteen-minute coffee break in the 
afternoon previously enjoyed by Water Department employees. 
^Ulster County Sheriff, 27 PERB J[3028, at 3069 (1994). 
-
xSee, e.g. , Town of Smithtown, 25 PERB J[3081 (1992) ; City of 
Auburn, 23 PERB f3044 (1990); County of Yates, 22 PERB 53017 
(1989) . 
Board - U-17333 -4 
2. Sign and post the attached notice in all locations at 
which notices of information to unit employees are 
ordinarily posted.^7 
DATED: January 29, 1997 
Albany, New York 
T&Uil^ k,(C^yJL 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric/tT. Schmertz, Membe^ 
^While the AKT ordered the Town to negotiate in good faith with 
CSEA concerning the number of coffee breaks taken by unit 
employees in the Water Department, we have deleted this portion 
pursuant to our decision in Middle Country Central School 
District. 23 PERB f3045 (1990). 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Town of Clarence Water Department (Town) in the unit represented by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Town of Clarence Unit of Local 815 that the Town will restore 
the practice of one fifteen-minute coffee break in the morning and one fifteen-minute coffee break in the afternoon previously 
enjoyed by Water Department employees. 
Dated By . . . . 
(Representative) (Title) 
TOWN OF CLARENCE 
T Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by *ny other material. 
o STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
KENNETH SWART, 
Petitioner, 
— — — — ™ =-and= — -^CASE^NOv"C=4535— 
TOWN OF SAUGERTIES, 
Employer 
-and-
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE, INC. 
Intervenor. 
THOMAS P. HALLEY, Esq., for Intervenor 
) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The United Federation of Police, Inc. (Federation) seeks 
permission to appeal from a ruling made by the Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) assigned by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) to investigate a petition 
for decertification of the Federation filed by an employee in a 
unit of police officers of the Town of Saugerties (Town). The 
Federation objected to the petition on the ground, inter alia, 
that the employee petitioner had failed to indicate on the 
petition whether or not he had an affiliation. The Federation 
argues that the petition is invalid because the petitioner did 
not state on the petition form whether or not he had an 
affiliation. The ALJ dismissed this claim as without merit, 
Board - C-4535 -2 
concluding that an individual employee is not required to 
indicate an affiliation on a decertification petition.^ 
Appeals from rulings made during the processing of a 
representation petition which is still pending before the 
Director are considered with our permission only pursuant to 
§201.9(c)(4) of the Rules. In a recent decision,-7 also 
involving the Federation and this same representative, we held 
that we would not entertain appeals from rulings which are made 
during the processing of a representation petition pending before 
the Director unless there are present unusual circumstances 
resulting in extreme prejudice to the party which is seeking the 
permission to appeal. We specifically held that no interlocutory 
appeal would be considered if the ruling sought to be appealed 
could be adequately reviewed after the Director had completed the 
investigation.of all questions concerning representation. We 
came to this conclusion to prevent or minimize delays in the 
processing of representation petitions which are caused by 
interlocutory appeals. 
i7The petition is not for certification of any employee 
organization. A petition seeking the decertification of a 
current bargaining agent may be filed by one or more employees 
pursuant to §201.2(a) of the Rules of Procedure (Rules). 
^Town of Putnam Valley and Town of New Paltz, 28 PERB [^3049 
(1995). The Federation representative's actions in conjunction 
with those cases led to misconduct charges being filed against 
him by the representative of the petitioners in those cases. The 
misconduct charges, which include allegations that the 
Federation's representative filed frivolous objections to those 
petitions, are currently pending before the agency. 
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The exceptions we are asked to consider in this case can be 
reviewed after the petition is processed to completion and they 
are of a type less warranting permission to appeal than those 
raised in the other cases. The Federation's request for 
permission to appeal the ruling in issue in this case is denied. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: January 29, 1997 
Albany, New York 
K(U \sA JC,H v^yU 




> STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF NEWBURGH, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17743 
PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF 
NEWBURGH, NEW YORK, INC., 
Respondent. 
HITSMAN, HOFFMAN AND O'REILLY (JOHN F. O'REILLY of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
HAROLD, SALANT, STRASSFIELD AND SPIELBERG (CHRISTOPHER 
HAROLD of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of 
Newburgh (City) to a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) finding 
mandatory several demands submitted by the Patrolmen's Benevolent 
Association of Newburgh, New York, Inc. (PBA) to compulsory 
interest arbitration. 
The City excepts to the Director's finding that demands 
numbered 20, 33, 36, 50 and 51 are mandatory subjects of 
negotiation.-7 The PBA supports the Director's decision. 
-
7No exceptions were filed to the Director's determination that 
the demands numbered 1, 15, 21, 22, 30, 39, 43 and 44 are 
mandatory subjects of negotiation. 
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-2 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
DEMAND NO. 20 
All employees shall receive a minimum of 4 hours pay 
when called in for or who voluntarily accept additional 
duty. If said employee is called in or voluntarily 
"~~ ^acT^p"t"s~du"ty~the performance of^whiSH~tSkesless than ~4 
hours, said employee shall have the option of leaving 
employment and not being paid for that part of the 
minimum call-back period not worked. Said employee 
shall be paid overtime at the rate of one and one-half 
their hourly rate of pay. 
The Director found that this demand was essentially a demand 
for wages and was, thus, a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
The City argues that the demand, by setting a minimum call-in of 
four hours, requires it to allow employees to remain on duty when 
their services may no longer be needed. That is not correct. 
Nothing in this demand prevents the City from releasing the 
employee from duty at any time. It simply requires that when 
released the employee receives a minimum of four hours pay. 
Compensation is the necessary derivative of call-in demands, 
which are mandatory subjects of negotiation.-' The City further 
argues that by allowing employees to leave when the assignment 
for which they were called in is completed, its right to control 
staffing and manpower is limited. That part of the demand simply 
allows the employee the option, if the assignment for which the 
employee has been called in is completed in less than four hours, 
of leaving and taking overtime pay for the hours actually worked. 
^See Buchanan Police Ass'n, 29 PERB J[3061 (1996) . 
i 
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The determination as to whether the assignment is complete rests 
with the City. Nothing in this demand' prevents the delivery of 
any service. At most, it requires that further services be 
provided by someone other than the employee who has come in to 
perform the assignment identified by the employer. As the demand 
does not by its terms prevent the delivery of any service, it is 
no more than a demand for premium pay and is mandatorily 
negotiable.-7' 
DEMAND NO. 33, AS AMENDED 
Bargaining unit members shall be notified of the right, 
and shall be given the opportunity to acquire the 
assistance and representation of the Association and 
its attorney at any disciplinary action. The City 
shall notify the President of the Association prior to 
commencing any disciplinary action. 
The City argues that the Director erred in determining that 
this demand is a mandatory subject of negotiation because it 
unduly interferes with the City's right to investigate potential 
disciplinary violations. The City objects only to the last 
sentence of the demand, which the Director found to be a 
reasonable notice requirement. Disciplinary procedures are 
generally mandatory subjects of negotiation unless they unduly 
delay the employer from carrying out its administrative 
responsibilities.-7 This demand merely requires the City to 
notify the PBA president before it commences a disciplinary 
-
70range County Community College Faculty Ass'n, 10 PERB [^3080 
(1977) . 
^Amherst Police Club, Inc.. 12 PERB ^3071 (1979). 
Board - U-17743 
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action; it cedes no control over the decision whether to 
discipline to the PBA and, as such, it is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. 
DEMAND NO. 36 
Provide contractual prohibition against City 
~" contracting^^ut^b^rg^inihg unit workr ~~~~ ~^  "~~ ~"~~~ 
The City argues that this demand is nonmandatory because it 
does not incorporate the various balancing tests we have used in 
determining whether a violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act has 
occurred when an employer unilaterally transfers unit work to 
nonunit employees or employees of a third party.-'' We have long 
held that a demand which seeks to preclude an employer from 
contracting out unit work is a mandatory- subject of negotiation, 
as long as the demand involves current unit work.-7 This 
demand is, therefore, mandatorily negotiable. 
DEMAND NO. 50 
Association Release Time: Five (5) days exclusively 
for the Vice-President; ten (10) days exclusively for 
the President; five (5) days for other Board members to 
be selected by the President. Said release days may be 
utilized simultaneously. 
The Director found this demand to be mandatory because it 
provides for paid organization leave for employees. The City 
asserts that the demand interferes with its right to determine 
^See State of New York (Dep't of Correctional Serv.), 27 PERB 
,f3055 (1994), conf'd, 220 A.D.2d 19, 29 PERB 17008 (3d Dep't 
1996) ; Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth. , 18 PERB ?[3083 (1985) . 
^New York City Transit Auth.. 22 PERB f6501 (1989) ; Somers 
Faculty Ass'n, 9 PERB 13014 (1976). 
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its staffing needs and its delivery of service to the public 
because the demand creates the potential for several employees to 
be on organization leave at the same time. We have previously 
held that paid time off for employees to work on behalf of their 
employee organization is mandatorily negotiable.-7 We have also 
held some broadly worded time off clauses to be nonmandatory, but 
only when they have interfered with an employer's right to fix 
staffing levels to such an extent that the employer is unable to 
provide its services.-7 However, here, the City argues only 
that there is a potential that several employees will take the 
same day off. The clause does not, therefore, interfere with 
staffing levels to the extent necessary to render it 
nonmandatory. 
DEMAND NO. 51 
The City shall provide time during a police officer's 
training period for the purpose of Union President or 
his or her designee advising said trainee of his or her 
rights as a Bargaining Unit member. 
The City argues that the above demand is nonmandatory 
because it requires it to provide the PBA with time during work 
and space on premises to meet with trainees to discuss employee 
organization business and that this constitutes improper 
assistance and support for the PBA. This demand was properly 
z/Troy Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, Local 2304, 10 PERB f3 015 
(1977); City of Albany, 7 PERB f3078 (1974). 
^Cortland Paid Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 2737. 29 PERB 53037 
(1996) ; Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of Newburgh, New York, Inc., 
18 PERB f3065 (1985). 
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found by the Director to be a demand for access reasonably 
related to the PBA's duties as the bargaining agent and is, 
therefore, mandatorily negotiable.-7 
For the reasons set forth above, the City's exceptions are 
denied and the decision of the Director is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 29, 1997 
Albany, New York 
1A tuo*41 
Pafuline R. ^Kinse l l a ' , C h a i r p e r s o n 
E r i c J/"Schmertz, Member 
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^ STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matters of 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, DIVISION 72 6, 
AFL-CIO, and AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, 
DIVISION 1056, AFL-CIO, 
— — — — — — — — ~T -——Gharg-i-ng—Parfeies, — — - — — —-
-and- CASE NOS. U-17434 & 
U-17435 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent.. 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17447 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY 
and MANHATTAN AND BRONX SURFACE 
TRANSIT OPERATING AUTHORITY, 
Respondents. 
GLADSTEIN, REIF & MEGINNISS (KENT Y. HIROZAWA of counsel), 
for Amalgamated Transit Union, Divisions 726 and 1056, 
AFL-CIO 
O'DONNELL, SCHWARTZ, GLANSTEIN & ROSEN (MALCOLM A. GOLDSTEIN 
of counsel), for Local 100, Transport Workers Union, AFL-CIO 
MARTIN A. SCHNABEL (KENNETH H. SCHIFFRON and AUDREY DANIEL 
of counsel), for Respondents 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us at this time pursuant to a motion 
filed by the charging parties, Amalgamated Transit Union, 
Divisions 726 and 1056, AFL-CIO (ATU), and Local 100, Transport 
Workers—Union^APL—e-10^(-TWU) 
and supporting memorandum of law filed by the respondents, New 
York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) and Manhattan and Bronx 
Surface Transit Operating Authority (MABSTOA). NYCTA and MABSTOA 
have taken exceptions to a decision by an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) finding that they violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when they unilaterally 
promulgated and implemented what were held to be new work rules 
and penalties pertaining to the removal of bus drivers from 
service as a result of drug or alcohol convictions, traffic 
accidents or certain violations of the State's Vehicle and 
Traffic Law (VTL). 
ATU and TWU argue that certain parts of the exceptions and 
the supporting brief raise issues and arguments which the parties 
foreclosed from consideration by express stipulation. 
NYCTA and MABSTOA oppose the motion and any further 
extension of time to respond to the exceptions. 
ATU's and TWU's motion to strike was filed admittedly to 
"save them the trouble and expense of briefing issues that they 
should not have to address." This type of motion, however, has 
no precedent in practice and. is not authorized by our Rules of 
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Procedure (Rules), which provide for responses to exceptions 
within specific and limited time frames, with such extensions of 
time as are necessary and appropriate. Such an extension of time 
was granted to ATU and TWU upon NYCTA's and MABSTOA's consent. 
However, in lieu of responding to the exceptions, ATU and TWU 
have filed this motion to strike. 
Our policy of preventing the delay occasioned by the 
consideration of interlocutory appeals from interim ALJ 
determinations-7 applies equally to this type of motion. 
Similarly, in the absence of a showing of substantial prejudice, 
we should and do defer the review of the issues raised by this 
type of motion until such time as the entire case is ready for 
decision. Applying these principles to the motion before us, we 
conclude that questions as to whether certain of NYCTA's and 
MABSTOA's exceptions are in derogation of the parties' 
stipulations and, if so, whether those stipulations should bind 
us to any extent on appeal can be fully reviewed as appropriate 
under the exceptions and any response thereto. We, therefore, 
deny the motion to strike parts of the exceptions and brief. 
ATU and TWU have requested a further extension of time to 
file a response to the exceptions if their motion is denied. 
Given the uncertainties surrounding the filing and disposition of 
-''interlocutory appeals from ALJ rulings and other nonfinal 
determinations are heard only if the underlying issues cannot be 
adequately reviewed upon exceptions and responses to the AKT's 
dispositive decision and order. 
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this novel motion, and as NYCTA and MABSTOA are not prejudiced by 
an extension, an extension of time is hereby granted. A response 
to the exceptions will be deemed timely if filed and served in 
accordance with our Rules on or before February 11, 1997. SO 
ORDERED. 
DATED: January 29, 1997 
Albany, New York 
Pafuline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric/cf. Schmertz, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MIGUEL SANCHEZ, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-4499 
CONVENTION CENTER OPERATING 
CORPORATIONr— — — — — — — — — - ™ — 
Employer, 
- and -
LOCAL 1180, COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS 
OF AMERICA, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
MIGUEL SANCHEZ, pro se 
ELIZABETH BRADFORD, GENERAL COUNSEL, for Employer 
WILLIAM F. HENNING, for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On January 16, 1996, Miguel Sanchez (petitioner) filed a 
timely petition for decertification of Local 1180, Communications 
Workers of America, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (intervenor), the current 
negotiating representative for employees of the Convention Center 
Operating Corporation in the following unit: 
Included: All Public Safety Supervisors. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Upon consent of the parties, a mail ballot election was held 
on August 6, 1996. The results of this election show that the 
majority of eligible employees in the unit who cast valid ballots 
Case No. C-4499 -2-
no longer desire to be represented for purposes of collective 
negotiations by the intervenor.-7 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the intervenor be, and it 
hereby is, decertified as the negotiating agent for the unit. 
DATED: January 29, 1997 
Albany, New York 
jLU f ^1 
PauAine R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
S^^^^x^^^7! 
Eric J./Schmertz, Member 
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 By decision dated December 9, 1996 (29 PERB fl4032), the 
Director dismissed election objections filed by the 
intervenor; no exceptions to the Director's decision have 
been filed. Of the three ballots cast, one was for 
representation and two were against representation. There 
were no challenged ballots. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of the Petition of 
NASSAU COMMUNITY COLLEGE FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
CASE NO. 1-0043 
To review the implementation of local 
government—provisions—and--proeedures-———= — - — — — — — 
pursuant to §212 of the Civil Service Law 
and PERB Rule §203.8 
CLAUDIA SCHACTER-deCHABERT, for Petitioner 
JACK D. TILLEM, ESQ., for Nassau County Public Employment 
Relations Board 
INGERMAN SMITH, L.L.P. (JOHN H. GROSS Of counsel), for 
Nassau Community College 
BEE, EISMAN & READY (HOWARD B. COHEN of counsel), for County 
of Nassau 
PRYOR, CASHMAN, SHERMAN & FLYNN (RICHARD M. BETHEIL of 
counsel), for Adjunct Faculty Association of Nassau County, 
Amicus Curiae 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On or about November 9, 1995, the Nassau Community College 
Federation of Teachers, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (NCCFT), by its 
president Philip Y. Nicholson, filed a petition with the Board to 
review the continuing implementation of the provisions and 
procedures of the Nassau County Public Employment Relations Board 
(local board). NCCFT filed its petition under §212 of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) and §203.8 of our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules). 
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The petition concerns an April 28, 1995 Hearing Officer's 
Report and Decision, adopted by the local board by an order dated 
October 24, 1995. The local board dismissed a petition by NCCFT 
to add four titles to a bargaining unit of instructional and non-
instructional employees that it represents at the Nassau County 
Community College (College).-7 The hearing officer found three 
of the titles to be confidential-7 and excluded them from the 
bargaining unit. In addition, he found the Director of Special 
Programs for Business to be managerial and also excluded that 
position from the unit. It is undisputed that the local board's 
order adopting his decision was subject to judicial review under 
Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR), and that 
no party filed such a petition. 
NCCFT's petition before us alleges that the local board's 
decision and order is not substantially equivalent to PERB's 
decisions and that it deprives employees of their rights under 
the Act. NCCFT filed a brief asking us to assume jurisdiction 
over the representation petition, and to find that the four at-
issue titles are neither managerial nor confidential and should 
properly be placed in its bargaining unit. 
The local board and the College filed answers opposing the 
implementation petition. The County of Nassau (County) 
i7NCCFT withdrew its petition as to a fifth position. 
-
7The Assistant to the Director/Administration and Finance, the 
Assistant to the Director/Special Programs for Business, and the 
Director of Special Programs. 
Board - 1-0043 . -3 
intervened in the proceeding, and it, too, filed a brief opposing 
the petition, arguing that this Board lacks jurisdiction to 
review the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the hearing 
officer and the local board. 
We designated Counsel to investigate the petition. In the 
course of that investigation, Counsel concluded that the petition 
could raise a material issue about the status of the College and 
County as joint employers and, therefore, about the jurisdiction 
of the local board over the representation petition. Therefore, 
on September 6, 1996, Counsel wrote to the parties about the 
jurisdiction issue. Counsel's letter called their attention to 
our precedents holding that community colleges are joint 
employers with their sponsoring counties, and invited them to 
submit briefs regarding what significance, if any, those cases 
might have regarding the local board's jurisdiction over the 
representation proceeding under review. 
In response, NCCFT filed a brief which argues that the local 
board does not have jurisdiction over employees of the 
Coliege/County, and which again urges us to assume jurisdiction 
and to add the at-issue titles to its unit. The College also 
filed a brief which asserts that the College and County are a 
joint employer of the College's staff and that the local board 
therefore has no jurisdiction over the representation petition. 
The County filed a brief which maintains that we do not have 
the power in the context of an implementation petition to 
determine whether the local board has subject matter jurisdiction 
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over NCCFT's representation petition. -The County argues that 
nothing in our Rules regarding implementation petitions permits 
us to annul the proceeding under review because of the local 
board's alleged lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
In addition, the Adjunct Faculty Association of Nassau 
Community College (AFA), the certified bargaining representative 
of the College's adjunct faculty, requested and was given the 
opportunity to submit a brief amicus curiae in this proceeding. 
AFA's brief argues that we have the authority to grant NCCFT's 
petition without reaching the issue of the local board's 
jurisdiction. Indeed, AFA urges us not to reach the jurisdiction 
issue, asserting that a determination by the Board that the 
College and the County are a joint employer of the College's 
faculty members, and that the local board does not have 
jurisdiction over them, will destabilize labor relations at the 
College, contrary to the purposes of the Act. 
We will first consider the scope of our authority and 
jurisdiction in this proceeding. Section 212 of the Act provides 
that a local government may for its employees adopt its own 
provisions and procedures for resolving certain disputes, 
including representation disputes, designating employees as 
managerial or confidential, and settling impasses that arise in 
negotiations. This local option, however, is subject to our 
determination that the local provisions and procedures and their 
continuing implementation are "substantially equivalent" to the 
provisions and procedures provided by the Act. 
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On the basis of that authority, Part 203.8 of our Rules 
authorizes any person to file a "petition to review the question 
of whether provisions and procedures of a local government are 
being implemented in a manner substantially equivalent to the 
provisions and procedures set forth in the act and [our 
Rules].n-f That is the limited question we must decide here. 
Stated differently, §212 of the Act requires us to determine 
whether the local board is continuing to implement the purposes 
and protections of the Act, under its local law and procedures, 
in a manner that is substantially equivalent to what the Act 
promises to all of New York's public employees. 
If a local board's jurisdiction to act were not a necessary 
part of our review under §212 of the Act, we could be required in 
a "continuing implementation" review proceeding to affirm that a 
local board had acted in a manner substantially equivalent to 
this Board even though it lacked threshold jurisdiction. We do 
not interpret §212 of the Act or our Rules as prohibiting or 
limiting our review of ultra vires acts by a local board. 
Therefore, our authority must encompass a determination in all 
cases of whether a local board has acted in excess of its 
jurisdiction in implementing its local law. 
Having reached that conclusion, we turn next to the question 
of whether the County and College are a joint employer of the at-
issue employees. If so, then the local.board has no jurisdiction 
^Rules §203.8(b). 
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over the employees of that joint employer and had no power to 
issue the determination in the proceeding under review here. 
The NCCFT, the County and the College are all signatories to 
an agreement which sets terms and conditions of employment for 
employees in the bargaining unit represented by NCCFT.-7 
Moreover, the agreement states that "[t]he County of Nassau, 
through the Nassau Community College, is engaged in furnishing 
vitally important educational services to the public." Thus, we 
find that the College is a county-sponsored community college, 
sponsored by the County of Nassau.-7 
Our decisions hold that "a county-sponsored community 
college is a . . . joint employer with the sponsoring county of 
the employees who work for the community college because control 
over the terms and conditions of employment of those employees is 
shared.11-7 Therefore, the College is a joint employer with the 
sponsoring county, the County of Nassau, and those who work at 
the College are employees of a joint employer as a matter of law. 
-
7The agreement, however, is cast only in terms of "mutual 
promises and obligations" running between the County and the 
NCCFT. 
-
7See Kuznetz v. County of Nassau, A.D.2d , 645 N.Y.S.2d 520 
(2d Dep't 1996) ("The County is the local sponsor of the College 
ii \ 
• • • * J 
-
7County of Jefferson and Jefferson County Community College 
(hereafter County of Jefferson^, 26 PERB f3010, at 3018 (1993), 
conf'd sub nom. Jefferson County v. PERB, 204 A.D.2d 1001, 27 
PERB «R7010 (4th Dep't), leave to appeal denied, 84 N.Y.2d 804, 27 
PERB 5[7014 f 1994): Genesee Community College, 24 PERB ^3017 
(1991). 
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It is axiomatic that where a local government elects the 
local option under § 212 of the Act, the local board it creates 
has jurisdiction over the employees of only that local government 
as a public employer. If it were otherwise, then one local 
government, for example, a county, could claim that a board that 
it creates has jurisdiction over the labor relations between 
another local government, for example, a school district, and its 
employees. The joint employer here, the College and County, is 
an employing entity under the Act distinct and separate from the 
County as a public employer.-7 Those who work at the College 
are not employees of the County. They are employees of a joint 
employer that consists of two otherwise distinct entities, which 
together constitute a public employer separate from the County. 
The local board was formed by an ordinance of the Board of 
Supervisors of the County of Nassau and approved by its County 
Executive.-7 As such, the jurisdiction of that local board can 
extend to the employees of only that local government.-7 The 
-
7See Jefferson County v. PERB. id. 
^Nassau County Ordinance No. 549-1981, section 1, states that 
"the Board of Supervisors hereby finds and declares that it is in 
the best interests of the citizens of the County and the 
employees of the Nassau County Government to provide for the 
effective implementation of the requirements of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, as set forth in Article 14 of the 
Civil Service Law . . . ." 
-
7The County argues that section 5(c)(6) of Nassau County 
Ordinance No. 549-1981 provides for the appropriate impasse 
resolution procedures "[w]here Nassau County is, for the purposes 
of this ordinance, the public employer of employees of an 
educational institution . . .," apparently arguing that this is a 
reference to the College. Even if this provision in fact intends 
to assert jurisdiction over the College, the State Legislature 
has not authorized it. 
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local board cannot extend its jurisdiction to the employees of 
any other government or public employer. Accordingly, the local 
board did not have jurisdiction over the representation petition 
at issue here, which sought to add titles to a bargaining unit of 
employees of the joint employer College/County. 
We are aware that all parties have long assumed that the 
local board has jurisdiction over the College. This assumption 
is understandable if only because this is the first occasion we 
have had to review the continuing implementation of provisions 
and procedures by a local board in a matter involving a county-
sponsored community college since our decision in County of 
Jefferson and its confirmation by the courts.—7 However, an 
incorrect assumption regarding jurisdiction, no matter how long-
standing or widely shared, cannot give jurisdiction to the local 
board that the State Legislature never gave to it. 
Finally, no actions of the local board are before us other 
than its exercise of jurisdiction over NCCFT's representation 
petition and the determination it issued as a result.—7 
Although there is argument that a decision finding that the local 
board is without jurisdiction over disputes involving employees 
—'County of Jefferson, supra note 6. 
—'The County urges in its brief that we find that the local board 
continued to have jurisdiction at least until the Appellate 
Division, Second Department's decision in Kuznetz v. County of 
Nassau, supra note 5, in which it specifically found that the 
College and County were the joint employers of an employee in the 
AFA's bargaining unit. We do not need to make that determination 
in this case. 
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of the joint employer will be disruptive because issues might be 
raised about the validity of actions taken by the parties based 
upon earlier determinations by the local board, those issues are 
not before us and we express no opinion about the disposition of 
them. Although we think it unlikely that the parties would 
choose to disrupt their labor relations, the potential for 
disruption cannot serve to vest the local board with the power to 
extend its jurisdiction to the employees of a different public 
employer. To the extent any disputes arise involving the 
parties' future actions, given that any local board's 
implementation of the Act must be substantially equivalent to our 
own and the fact that, in any event, no local board has 
jurisdiction over improper practice allegations, our decision 
will not disrupt the parties' future labor relationships to any 
appreciable degree, if at all. 
In view of the discussion above, we find in regard to the 
NCCFT's representation petition that the local board did not 
implement its local provisions and procedures in a manner 
substantially equivalent to that required by the Act and this 
Board's Rules. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Order of the Nassau 
County Public Employment Relations Board, dated October 24, 1995, 
in its case No. R-060, is hereby annulled and 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Nassau County Public 
Employment Relations Board implement its local provisions and 
procedures in a manner consistent with the determination herein. 
DATED: January 29, 1997 
Albany, New York 
ErjLd J. Schmertz, Meiaber 
